Please describe your proposed solution
The Problem
Cardano is a living system which grows and improves over time. Like a snake shedding its skin, the network can fork to update core functions and ensure relevance as technology and use cases evolve.
However, like Giorgio Zinetti rightly identified in a recent LinkedIn post, conflicts can arise with protocol updates. These conflicts, while carrying the potential for improvements, can have unwanted side effects. Especially larger conflicts that cannot be dealt with within the Cardano governance Process threaten to damage Cardano as a whole. Due to its fundamental role in evolving Cardano, forking is one of the attack vectors with tremendous potential for damage. A contentious or malicious fork could introduce vulnerabilities to the core of Cardano and bypass on-chain governance processes. It can also lead to a damaging, costly and potentially fatal public conflict about which chain is “Cardano” – as seen in previous Ethereum and Bitcoin forking wars. Additionally, other layers of the governance process may be at risk, if decision making, execution, accountability and dispute resolution are not all accounted for.
The Solution
To support the various stakeholders and community members of Cardano in mitigating governance risk, we propose to conduct comprehensive research on vulnerabilities and attack vectors within the wider Cardano Governance Process. Within this research, a special focus will lie on the treat of contentious hard forks (which can be malicious forks, or boycotted benevolent forks). We will identify attack scenarios, analyzing them and propose approaches to address the most crucial threats. Within our analysis, we will evaluate technical, economic and social attacks scenarios. While providing legal advice is outside of the scope of our research, we will highlight potential legal issues that might require further legal assessment.
Based on our comprehensive research we will develop a concept of how governance risk related to protocol upgrades can be mitigated. Again, the concept developed will factor in technical, economic and social aspects of protocol upgrades, providing a holistic view on the topic.
A special focus will be on the connection between off-chain governance elements (e.g. a protocol constitutions and other rulesets of specific stakeholder groups) and on-chain governance (e.g. protocol clients, governance smart contracts and token holder voting). The mitigation strategies will include elements that address risks related to a potential divergence between off-chain and on-chain decision making, including mechanisms to resolve disputes and enforce decision-making both off-chain and on-chain.
Our findings will be peer-reviewed by governance experts from the Q ecosystem, including academics from prestigious academic institutions and internationally practicing lawyers (e.g. – still to be confirmed – Prof. Strnad from Stanford Law School and Eric Alston from the University of Colorado).
The outcome of this project is a comprehensive report with a summary of our research findings, an outline of the concept for risk-mitigation strategies addressing potential governance vulnerabilities.